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Unlike those of most other European countries, the United Kingdom’s pension 
system is not well described by an analysis of the social security element. For 
thirty years or more, around half the workforce has been covered by occupa- 
tional pensions.  Something  like half  the income of  pensioners  comes from 
non-social  security sources, and this proportion is growing. Of the workforce 
in the mid- 1990s, three-quarters are “contracted out” of the second-tier State 
Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) into private occupational or per- 
sonal pensions. ‘ 
In fact, one can probably divide the population  nearing state pension  age 
into two groups-those  with and those without significant private provision. 
For those with private provision, state benefits are likely to be relatively unim- 
portant in understanding retirement behavior; the rules of their pension scheme 
will be rather more important. For the rest, the state system might be much 
more relevant, but especially the effective availability of benefits,  which ap- 
pears to differ somewhat from what one might understand from a simple read- 
ing of the rules governing benefit availability. 
Partly as a result of these facts, the United Kingdom also differs from many 
other countries in one other important respect-its  state pension system is sol- 
vent. Tax rates necessary to pay for it are not predicted to rise despite the fact 
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that the number of  people over state retirement age is predicted to rise from 
10.4 million in the mid-1990s to 11.5 million in 2020 and 14 million in 2050, 
representing an increase from  15.7 percent of the whole population to over 
24 percent.2 
In this paper, we begin by describing the past and current labor market be- 
havior of individuals around pension age. We also consider the coverage of the 
various parts of the social security system. We go on to explain the structure 
of state pensions in the United Kingdom, before computing the incentives for 
retirement that the structure creates. We end by considering some of the evi- 
dence on retirement behavior, especially with regard to the effects of occupa- 
tional pensions. 
10.1  The Labor Market Behavior of Older 
Persons in the United Kingdom 
The labor market behavior of older persons in the United Kingdom has been 
characterized by a severe fall in the participation of men, with younger cohorts 
showing distinctly less attachment to the labor market after age fifty-five. The 
rate of participation among recent cohorts falls sharply below 80 percent after 
age fifty and declines rapidly thereafter. In contrast, the secular rise in the par- 
ticipation  of  women  has  resulted  in  a  small upward  trend  in participation 
among women in the age bracket fifty-five to sixty, with participation rates 
approaching those for men in that age group. 
Three micro-data sources are used in the following discussion. One impor- 
tant primary data source is the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey (FES), which 
is available in consistent annual form for the period 1961-94.  This is a continu- 
ous sample survey of some seven thousand households collecting information 
on expenditures, incomes, labor market activity, and demographics. A second 
source is the U.K. Labour Force Survey, published by the Office of National 
Statistics and covering some eighty thousand individuals for the period from 
the  1970s through to the present  day.  Finally, we make use  of  a new data 
source, the Family Resources Survey, a new household-level data set set up by 
the Department of Social Security that contains detailed income information 
for a sample of  twenty-six thousand households. It is more than three times 
the size of the FES, which we traditionally use, and is specifically designed to 
provide good-quality information on income and benefits. 
10.1.1  Historical Trends 
To  show how activity rates by age group have changed over time, we make 
use of  data from the U.K. Labour Force Survey (Labour Market Trends [May 
19961). This covers the period from  1971 to 1995 and shows the proportion 
2. These figures include the effect of  the equalization of state pension age at sixty-five for both 
men and women, a change that will be phased in between 2010 and 2020. 405  Pensions and Retirement in the United Kingdom 
1 




  ......  ... 
......  ....... 
0.6 
0 4  .................................................  ,t 
45-54  55-59  60-64  65-69  ----_  .........  -- 
Fig. 10.1  Male activity rates, 1971-95 
in each age group counting as economically active-in  employment or self- 
employment or unemployed and actively seeking work (ILO definition). The 
information that we need is split into four age groups-forty-five  to fifty-four, 
fifty-five to fifty-nine, sixty to sixty-four, and sixty-five to sixty-nine. 
In figure  10.1 we present the picture of activity rates for men. Here, the 
drop in participation rates is clear. Falls are recorded for each of these groups, 
although much less dramatically for the youngest group, among whom 90 per- 
cent were still recorded as being active in 1995, a drop of 5 percentage points 
since  1971. For the other age groups, falls in  activity rates are much more 
dramatic-from  well over 90 to 74 percent for fifty-five- to fifty-nine-year- 
olds and from 83 to 50 percent for sixty- to sixty-four-year-olds. The changes 
are not smooth. There are very dramatic falls in activity rates, especially for 
sixty- to sixty-four-year-olds, in the early 1980s. This seems strong evidence 
that the structural change in the labor market with the loss of many jobs in 
traditional industries where there was a predominance of older workers played 
an important part in the initial reduction in activity rates, although they never 
recovered with the economic upturn. It is also interesting to note that there 
have been big activity drops among sixty-five- to sixty-nine-year-olds but that 
these occurred earlier, in the mid-1970s. 
The pattern of changes in activity rates for women over time is very different 
from that of males, as is evident in figure 10.2.  Among the youngest age group, 
activity rates grew virtually constantly over the period from 62 to 75 percent. 
Among fifty-five- to fifty-nine-year-olds, activity rates were uneven over the 
period but generally increasing. Among sixty- to sixty-four-year-olds, the pat- 406  Richard Blundell and Paul Johnson 
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Fig. 10.2  Female activity rates, 1971-95 
tern seems to be slightly U shaped, falling in the  1970s and then rising in the 
early 1990s. 
These time-series figures by age group cloud some important date-of-birth 
cohort effects. We do not have an adequate run of  panel  data to look at an 
actual cohort's behavior, but we can use the long run of cross-sectional  data 
that we have to create "pseudocohorts"  and thereby see what happens to labor 
market activity within a particular date-of-birth cohort as the cohort ages. 
Figure 10.3 shows labor market activity rates between the ages of fifty-five 
and sixty-five for three cohorts of men-the  first born in  1913, reaching age 
sixty-five in  1978; the second born in  1921, reaching age sixty-five in  1986; 
and the third born in 1928, reaching age sixty-five in 1993. The data are drawn 
from the FES over the period 1968-94. Activity is defined as working or seek- 
ing work. 
The oldest group had higher activity rates at each age, with activity falling 
from two-thirds to 20 percent between the ages of sixty-four and sixty-five for 
this group. For a very large portion of this cohort, retirement started at the state 
pension age. For the middle cohort, the big fall in activity occurred between the 
ages of sixty-one and sixty-five, while, for the youngest cohort, labor market 
withdrawal started earlier still. 
10.  I .2  Benefit Coverage 
Coverage of the U.K.  state pension  system is now virtually  universal for 
people under the state pension age. Anybody in work and earning more than 
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Fig. 10.3  Male activity rates in three cohorts 
anybody not working who is unemployed or disabled or who is at home look- 
ing after children of school age. (A more detailed exposition of the relevant 
rules is set out in sec. 10.2  below.) Among men, universal coverage has been a 
fact virtually since the introduction of the current regime in the late 1940s.  For 
women, the movement toward full coverage is only just reaching completion. 
This is the result of  three separate changes. The first is just the greatly  in- 
creased levels of economic activity among women. The second is the introduc- 
tion, in  1978, of  Home Responsibilities Protection, which effectively credits 
contributions for women with dependent children. The third is the phasing out 
of what is known as the married women's rate of national insurance contribu- 
tions. This latter feature of the system allowed married women to pay much 
reduced social insurance contributions in return for forgoing rights to the basic 
pension in their own right. Since 1978, no new entry to this lower-rate national 
insurance  band  has been  allowed. As a result  of  this, by  2010 virtually  all 
women reaching  the state pension  age will have some entitlement to a state 
pension. 
In sum, there has been virtually 100 percent coverage of  male workers over 
the past thirty years. Coverage for women has been less but is now almost 100 
percent. No published statistics are available that allow this trend to be graphed 
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Fig. 10.4  Pension and invalidity benefit (IVB) receipt among over fifty-fives 
Finally, in this historical section, we show how the proportions of men and 
women aged fifty-five and over receiving retirement pensions or invalidity pen- 
sions have changed over time. These trends are illustrated in figure 10.4, from 
which a number of interesting facts emerge. First, a rather higher proportion 
of women than men receive a pension. This fact-at  first sight surprising- 
arises from the lower pension age for women, the higher proportion of women 
over age fifty-five who  are also over age sixty, and the receipt  by  married 
women and widows of pensions entitlement to which was gained through their 
husbands contributions. Second, there has been a rise over time in the propor- 
tion of men and women with retirement pensions. Third, for men, there has 
been a very substantial increase in the proportion receiving invalidity pensions 
from a mere 1 or 2 percent in the early 1970s to 10 percent by the early 1990s. 
There has been no such increase for women, although there are signs of this 
changing by the start of the 1990s. 
10.1.3 
Participation rates  by  age and sex are presented in  figure  10.5. The vast 
majority (80 percent or so) of men in their late forties are (full-time) workers. 
This proportion drops to around 40 percent by age sixty. For women, the pat- 
tern is similar, but it should be emphasized that one sees much lower full-time 
working  and  higher  levels  of  part-time  work.  Work  participation  among 
women tails off quite rapidly for the fifty-year-old women, falling from about 
60 percent in the late forties to 40 percent in the mid-fifties, 30 percent in the 
late fifties, and 20 percent at age sixty. 
Figure  10.6 provides  somewhat more detail than this using data from the 
Family Resources Survey. It considers four subsets of men: those employed 
working full-time (including the self-employed), those unemployed and seek- 
ing work, the disabled, and the retired. We ignore part-timers, who never make 
up more than 3 percent of any male age group. 
The vast majority (80 percent or so) of men in their late forties are full-time 
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Fig. 10.5  Participation rates by age and sex (fraction in labor force) 
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Fig. 10.6  Economic activity of men by age 
workers; 7-10  percent consider themselves unemployed, and a further 7 per- 
cent are unoccupied, sick, or retired. The proportion  in full-time work falls 
steadily, reaching 75 percent of those in their early fifties, dropping to 60 per- 
cent of those in their late fifties, and dropping sharply again to 40 percent of 
sixty-year-olds. This drops again to 30 percent by  age sixty-four and then to 
under 10 percent at age sixty-six. By age sixty-one, the majority of men con- 
sider themselves unoccupied, retired, or long-term sick. Ninety percent are in 
this position at age sixty-six. Among those over seventy, fewer than 5 percent 
of those in our sample are in full-time work. 
Figure 10.7 shows the corresponding distribution of  activities for women. 410  Richard Blundell and Paul Johnson 
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Fig. 10.7  Economic activity of women by age 
Participation in work tails off quite rapidly in the fifties, falling from about 60 
percent in the late forties to 40 percent in the mid-fifties, 30 percent in the late 
fifties, and 20 percent at age sixty. The proportion unoccupied or retired at age 
fifty-nine is 59 percent, rising to 72, 75, and 80 percent at ages sixty, sixty- 
one, and sixty-two, respectively. Given that the state pension becomes available 
at age sixty, the increase in inactivity at that age is not surprising. 
The state pension age is five years younger for women than for men, but a 
higher proportion of women work past the state pension age. There are a num- 
ber of possible reasons for this. One is that there is some tendency for husbands 
and wives to retire at the same time, with the result that wives might not retire 
until their husband reaches age sixty-five. A second is that some occupational 
pension schemes have normal leaving ages for both men and women of  sixty- 
two or sixty-three. Finally, because many women reach age sixty without en- 
titlement to a full basic pension, they might work more years in order to de- 
fer receipt and thereby raise their eventual entitlement. 
For comparison, figures  10.8 and 10.9 present the hazard rates out of the 
labor force for men and women, respectively. The relatively small sample sizes 
in the Family Resources Survey, which has been used to construct these fig- 
ures, lead to exaggerated variation. Nevertheless, the growing rate of  exit for 
men beginning in their early fifties is clear, as is the strong peak at the official 
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Fig. 10.8  Hazard rate out of the labor force for men 
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Fig. 10.9  Hazard rate out of the labor force for women 
is no evidence of a peak at age fifty-five due mainly to the very different early 
retirement schemes available across occupations. There is, however, a peak at 
age sixty corresponding to the retirement age in many public-sector occupa- 
tions and to the rules of the social security system, which stop entitlement to 
welfare benefits being dependent on work availability from age sixty. This is 
something we discuss further below. For women, the picture has similar overall 412  Richard Blundell and Paul Johnson 
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Fig. 10.10  Public income receipt for men (IVB = invalidity benefit) 
shape but displays a swift increase in the hazard up to the retirement age of 
sixty. 
10.1.4  Income Sources of Older Persons 
Overall rates of  public income receipt for men by age group are shown in 
figure 10.10. More detail is provided in table 10.1. These figures are based on 
data from the Family Resources Survey. The table shows the proportion of men 
in  age bands from forty-five up receiving particular types of  state benefits3 
(excluding private pensions). The columns sum too more than one hundred 
because it is possible to be in receipt of more than one benefit at a time. The 
proportion receiving some benefit (we exclude the child benefit) rises gradually 
with age. Over 40 percent of  sixty- to sixty-four-year-olds receive some bene- 
fit: one-quarter receive the invalidity benefit, 13 percent the minimum means- 
tested income support, and 10  percent other sorts of sickness benefits. The fact 
that we do not see virtually 100 percent of sixty-five- to sixty-nine-year-olds 
receiving a retirement pension is simply because 17 percent are receiving the 
invalidity benefit. Between the ages of sixty-five and seventy, it is possible to 
choose which to receive if the invalidity benefit was being received prior to age 
sixty-five. Because the invalidity benefit was nontaxable until 1995, there was 
an incentive to continue receiving it. 
Above age seventy-five, more than one man in ten receives means-tested 
3. The housing benefit is not included. Other includes such categories as war pensions, special 
payments, and a host of small-scale benefits. 413  Pensions and Retirement in the United Kingdom 
Table 10.1  State Benefit Receipt among Males (percentages by age band) 
45-49  50-54  55-59  60-64  65-69  70-74  75+ 
None  80  75  70  57  1  0  0 
Pension  0  0  0  0  81  99  99 
Invalidity benefit  4  8  17  25  17  0  0 
Income support  9  8  8  13  5  5  I1 
Other sick  5  7  7  10  7  3  1 
Other  10  9  9  9  8  13  16 
Source: Family Resources Survey, 1994-95. 
Table 10.2  Number of Male Invalidity Benefit Recipients by Age (numbers 
given in thousands) 
Men  1979-80  1984-85  1989-90  1993-94 
45-49  39  53  64  105 
50-54  56  75  108  134 
55-59  108  128  171  224 
60-64  171  239  266  322 
65 +  47  72  177  235 
All ages  506  613  917  1,217 
income support (the rate of receipt among women is more than double that). 
This reflects the fact that income support rates are actually higher than basic 
pension rates, especially for older pensioners. Administrative  statistics reveal 
that, in addition to these benefits, a further 11 percent of those over age seventy 
receive the housing benefit-designed  to help low-income individuals afford 
rented accommodation. 
Within the state welfare system itself, the most dramatic changes with re- 
spect to  numbers receiving benefits have been in the number of individuals, 
particularly pre-pension  age, receiving benefits initially designed for the long- 
term sick and disabled. The invalidity benefit is the most important of these. It 
is a contributory benefit payable to long-term sick individuals who can show 
that they are incapable of working owing to illness or disability and have been 
unable to work for at least twenty-eight weeks. Until recently, claimants have 
only been required to provide a certificate from their own doctor stating that 
they are incapable of  working as a result of  sickness. Since 1995 and the re- 
placement of the invalidity benefit by the incapacity benefit, the rules for en- 
titlement have been tightened with the express intention of halting the increase 
in numbers of recipients shown in table 10.2. 
This growth in the numbers appears to be related directly to growth in unem- 
ployment rates (see Disney and Webb 1991). Until the early 1990s, the benefit 
provided  income levels  significantly  in excess  of  such other social  security 
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Fig. 10.11  Private pension receipt by sex 
Table 10.3  Percentage of Birth Cohorts Recording Occupational Pension 
Receipt, by Birth Cohort, Gender, and Marital Status (men aged 
65-69,  women aged 60-64) 
Male  Married Female  Single Female 
Cohort  Pensioners  Pensioners  Pensioners 
1900-4  48  2 
1905-9  50  2 
1910-14  58  5 
1915-19  64  10 
1920-24  65  15 
1925-29  68  23 








Source: Johnson and Stears (1995), based on the 1961-93  FESs. 
related pensions were payable in the same way as for SERPS for those over the 
state pension age. Given that about a quarter of all men  aged between sixty 
and sixty-four received the invalidity benefit in 1994, there can be little doubt 
that the invalidity benefit has been used as an early retirement vehicle. 
In  figure  10.11, we provide  a  description  of  the  proportion  of  men  and 
women  at each age who are receiving  a private  pension. As in  the United 
States, this rises fairly rapidly after age fifty-five, with a large gap opening up 
between men and women after age sixty-five. Table 10.3 gives a similar picture 
of the proportion of various cohorts who were receiving occupational pensions 
in the first five years after the state pension age. An increase in pension cover- 
age for each successive cohort is evident, rising from around half to two-thirds 415  Pensions and Retirement in the United Kingdom 
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Fig. 10.12  Composition of family income by age of head of household 
of men, roughly doubling to  just under a half of single women, and rising from 
very few to about a quarter of married women. Average receipt has also risen. 
Among  recipients,  mean  real  occupational  pension  levels  have  doubled to 
nearly f90.00 per week for men and f60.00 for women. This important devel- 
opment in private, largely occupationally based pensions in the United King- 
dom is documented in further detail below. 
Finally, in figure  10.12, we present a picture of the distribution of family 
income by  source. Earnings remain the main source of family income until 
around age sixty, when the importance of public and private pension sources 
begins to play a dominant role. 
10.2  Key Features of the U.K. Pension and Social Security System 
As we have made clear, it is hard to consider the U.K. state pension system 
in isolation from the private sector. For one thing, among recently retired pen- 
sioners, private pensions make up close to half of total income in retirement- 
with the mean occupational pension  payment (among those receiving  some 
payment) approaching  E90.00 per week, which  compares with a basic state 
pension  of E61.15 per week. This is just about  16 percent  of  male average 
earnings. More important for understanding  the structure of the system, one 
needs to take account of the relation between SERPS and the private sector for 
the majority (over three-quarters) of workers at any time are “contracted out” 
of SERPS into private schemes. 416  Richard Blundell and Paul Johnson 
Traditionally, the state in the United Kingdom has offered just a basic pen- 
sion at close to “subsistence” levels. First introduced in  1906, and reformed 
into something approaching its current form following the last war, the basic 
pension provides a flat-rate benefit, unrelated to earnings levels, which was 
E61.15 per week for a single person in  1996. Although unrelated to earnings 
levels, it is nonetheless a “contributory” benefit, at least in principle. Entitle- 
ment to a full benefit depends on contributions being made (or credits received) 
for 90 percent of a working life. This requires forty-four years of contributions 
or  credits for men and thirty-nine years for women (rising to forty-four when 
pension ages are equalized at sixty-five in 2020). 
These contributory conditions are nowhere near as onerous as they appear. 
Any time spent unemployed or sicWdisabled gains credits-which  count in 
just the same way as contributions-and  time spent looking after children has, 
since 1978, reduced the effective number of years of contributions required 
through a system called Home Responsibilities Protection (HRP). Virtually all 
men aged sixty-five and over receive a full basic pension on the basis of their 
own contributions. The coverage of women currently over sixty is less compre- 
hensive. Fewer than 60  percent receive a full pension, and the majority of them 
do so only on the basis of contributions made by their deceased husband. How- 
ever, married women without rights of their own are entitled to a dependent’s 
addition to their husband’s pension, worth E36.60 per week in 1996. 
Low rates of entitlement among married women reflect long periods spent 
out of the labor market by  older cohorts, along with an option that married 
women used to be able to exercise whereby their national insurance contribu- 
tions were reduced in return for a loss of pension rights. Later generations have 
benefited from the introduction of Home Responsibilities Protection (in 1978); 
they have also seen higher levels of  female labor market participation. The 
consequence is that, by the early years of the next century, the vast majority of 
women as well as of men will retire with entitlement to a full basic pension 
(see Johnson and Stears 1996). 
Perhaps the most important feature of the basic pension is its low level. It 
represents just 16 percent of average male earnings. With indexation in line 
with the retail price index, its level relative to earnings is falling-it  was 20 
percent of the male average in the late 1970s. With continued price indexation, 
we can expect it to fall to just 7 or 8 percent of the male average by 2030. 
Currently, entitlement to the basic pension  depends only on contributory 
record and age-there  is no retirement test. It is possible, however, to defer 
pension receipt  by  up to five  years to “state retirement  age” (sixty-five for 
women, seventy for men). Deferral results in an increase in pension entitle- 
ment of 7.5 percent per year. This is more valuable to women than to men 
because of their higher life expectancy. Possibly as a result of this, 17 percent 
of female pensioners and 11 percent of males receive increments to their basic 
pensions as a result of deferral. There is no provision for the payment of retire- 
ment pensions before age sixty-five (men) or sixty (women). 417  Pensions and Retirement in the United Kingdom 
Deferral is becoming less widespread  following the abolition, in  1989, of 
the “earnings rule,” which effectively meant that those (women aged sixty to 
sixty-four and men sixty-five to sixty-nine) earning more than E75.00 per week 
(in 1989)  had their pension entitlement reduced. The reduction was fifty pence 
for every E1.00 between E75.00 and E79.00 of  earnings and E1.00 for every 
E 1  .OO  thereafter.  Virtually  all  those  affected  deferred  their  pension  receipt 
rather than taking a reduced amount. The fact that nearly a quarter of men and 
a third of women over age eighty, with pension entitlements in their own right, 
have pension increments as a result of deferral indicates that this was a rela- 
tively important provision when many younger pensioners worked, as they did 
in the 1960s and 1970s. 
One might have expected the complete abolition of this rule to lead to sig- 
nificantly changed behavior among those in the relevant age ranges. However, 
as Whitehouse (1990) points out, there was limited evidence that the rule was 
having much effect during the 1980s. We present new evidence here based on 
earnings distributions in the FES  in  1987-88  and in 1991-92.  It should be 
stressed that we have only very small samples of men  in work in these age 
groups-just  seventy-two  individuals in the two  years  1987 and  1988 and 
sixty-six individuals in 1991 and 1992. 
The graphs are presented with earnings shown in nominal terms. The maxi- 
mum on each graph is set such that it is effectively scaled up by nominal earn- 
ings growth-of  40 percent over the period. In other words, El65 in 1991-92 
becomes El15 in 1987-88  when deflated by nominal earnings growth. For ease 
of presentation, the graphs exclude those individuals earning over these max- 
ima. This excludes 20  percent of  the working individuals in 1987-88  but a 
third of those in 1991-92. 
Even with this small sample, there is clear evidence (shown in fig. 10.13)  of 
bunching at the earnings-rule level of E75.00 per week in 1987-88.  The major- 
ity of those in work were, however, earning well below this level and, as we 
noted, about a fifth were earning well in excess of it. There is no such obvious 
peak in figure 10.14. The increased proportion  earning over El70 might also 
be evidence of people being freed from the effects of the earnings rule. How- 
ever, such conclusions should be treated with considerable caution, given the 
sample sizes in the data. 
The basic pension remains by far the most important element in social secu- 
rity spending on the elderly. There are also, however, important income-related 
benefits. Of the 10 million pensioners in the United Kingdom, 1.5 million are 
dependent  on the minimum  means-tested  benefit  income  support, which is 
available at higher levels than the state pension. In addition, a similar number 
receive means-tested help with their housing costs. This means that the mini- 
mum social security income for a single sixty-five-year-old is not the E61.15 
available from the basic pension but the E67.05 available from income support 
plus the housing benefit to cover any rent. 
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Fig. 10.13  Weekly earnings of men aged 65-69 in 1987 and 1988 FES 
arrangement intended to provide only a bare minimum income level. Until the 
early 196Os, contributions were also paid at a flat rate. As they became partially 
income related, an earnings-related “graduated pension” was introduced. No 
further accruals were earned after 1975. Never generous, this pension is now 
a virtual irrelevance as its design purposely failed to allow for indexation. Al- 
though 7.5 million pensioners receive it, average receipt is just f2.00 per week. 
It can be safely ignored. 
The same is not true of its successor, SERPS-the  State Earnings Related 
Pension Scheme. SERPS was introduced only in 1978, with the intention that 
it would start paying out full benefits twenty years hence. Between 1978 and 
1999, there would be a very gradual building up of maximum SERPS benefits 
as each successive cohort of  retirees would have built up one more year of 
benefit entitlement. 
It was originally designed, broadly  speaking, to provide a pension  equal 
to one-quarter of earnings during the best twenty years of earnings, with full 
inheritance by surviving spouses. The earnings on which the pension is calcu- 
lated are bounded by the lower earnings limit (approximately equal to the basic 
pension) and the upper earnings limit (f455 per week, or just 20 percent above 
male average earnings, in 1996). Along with the basic pension, these earnings 
limits move up each year in line with prices. The result is that an increasing 
proportion of contributors has earnings above the upper earnings limit, which 
is itself not far in excess of male average earnings. Current contribution rates 
are 10 percent for employees and 10.2 percent for employers. The upper earn- 
ings limit caps contributions from employees but not from employers. 419  Pensions and Retirement in the United Kingdom 
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Fig. 10.14  Weekly earnings of men aged 65-69 in 1991 and 1992 FES 
At present,  SERPS entitlements are calculated as follows. Earnings above 
the national insurance upper earnings limit are ignored. Earnings in each fi- 
nancial year since 1978 are revalued to the year in which the individual reaches 
pensionable age by an index of economywide average earnings. From this fig- 
ure, the national insurance lower earnings limit in the year prior to retirement 
is deducted. The total revalued earnings net of the lower earnings limit are then 
multiplied by an accrual factor to amve at the additional pension entitlement. 
The accrual rate is determined by the year in which pension age is reached. It 
is currently 25/20 (1.25 percent or 1/80th). It is this accrual rate that determines 
the relation between level of SERPS entitlements and earnings levels. The cur- 
rent one-eightieth accrual rate is what allowed the scheme when introduced to 
provide a pension of  a quarter of earnings over twenty years. In other words, 
the  calculation  would  be  number  of  years  entitled  divided  by  eighty  and 
multiplied by the total level of revalued average earnings. 
From 1999 on, the SERPS accrual factor will gradually fall, reaching 20/49 
(0.41 percent or 1/244th) by 2027-28.  So, for people retiring after 2027-28, 
SERPS will be 49/244 (= 20 percent) of  average revalued earnings over their 
entire working life if they work for each of the available forty-nine years be- 
tween sixteen and sixty-five. Shorter working lives will reduce the numerator 
accordingly and thereby reduce the proportion of revalued earnings, which will 
form the SERPS payment. 
This fall in accrual rate was introduced in the Social Security Act of  1986 
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resulting in unsustainable levels of expenditure in the future. The main effect 
of  the changes will be to move from a benefit formula producing a pension 
worth 25 percent of best twenty years earnings to one producing 20 percent of 
lifetime average revalued earnings and a reduction in survivor benefits from 
100 percent of the SERPS payment to 50 percent of it. 
As with the basic pension, there is no provision for the early receipt of 
SERPS, but receipt can be deferred on the same basis as can the basic pension. 
Deferral, however, is rare. 
The result of the introduction of SERPS, especially for the generation retir- 
ing in the years around 2000, will be significantly to increase the social security 
income, and thus the total income, of  those  without a private pension. The 
retirement income of those in occupational pension schemes will have been 
largely unaffected by  its introduction, however, because, from its inception, 
such schemes have been able to contract out of SERPS. People in schemes that 
guarantee a certain level of benefit can give up rights to SERPS and pay lower 
national insurance contributions as a result. Since 1988, not only have tradi- 
tional final salary occupational pensions been able to contract out in this way, 
but so also have group money purchase and personal pension  schemes. So 
now about three-quarters of eligible workers (i.e., those earning over the lower 
earnings level) are not covered directly by SERPS. Half are in occupational 
schemes, and another quarter are in personal pensions. The coverage of per- 
sonal pensions is particularly high among young men, for whom the advan- 
tages of joining, given a rebate that is not age related and a SERPS system that 
is becoming less generous, are considerable. Occupational pension coverage is 
less clearly associated with a particular  age group, although those who are 
covered tend to work for large employers and to be relatively well off. 
These facts must be borne in mind when considering the effect of  social 
security on retirement. There can be no question that, for many people, it is 
the size of, and policies followed by, their particular occupational schemes that 
matter. In the future, personal  pensions will become much more important 
(very few have reached maturity) in this context. 
10.3  Retirement Incentives 
In this section, we look at the retirement incentives within the U.K. social 
security system by considering sample workers with specific sets of character- 
istics that are relevant to the calculation of state benefit income entitlement in 
retirement. The analysis reveals a number of  interesting features of the U.K. 
retirement benefit system. In particular, it demonstrates the role of benefits 
available before the state pension age and the rather wide range of incentives 
created for different individuals depending on their earnings, age, and marital 
status. 
In our simulations, we consider the incentives facing a man born in  1930 
and so reaching the state retirement age of sixty-five in 1995. 421  Pensions and Retirement in the United Kingdom 
In order for us to make the calculations, the first thing that matters is a work 
and earnings history. We actually need this only from 1978. We do not need to 
look beyond that because state pension entitlement became dependent on earn- 
ings only after that date.4 For our base case, we take the median earnings of a 
male worker up to age fifty and then project these forward by average earnings 
growth over the following twenty years. 
This results in a smooth increase in real earnings over time. But it does fail 
to take account of the falls in real earnings that one does observe in a cohort 
once the early to mid-fifties are reached. To some extent, this fall is a result of 
selection. Those  with  occupational  pensions  and higher earnings  are more 
likely to retire early. This means that the lower earnings recorded for older 
individuals are probably closer to the ones actually faced by those people most 
dependent on the state system. We also considered an individual facing the 
actual median earnings of his cohort through to age sixty-five. The results were 
very  similar, except  that the lower earnings resulted  in  higher  replacement 
rates. The results are set out in the appendix. 
With this information, we can calculate the amount of SERPS plus the basic 
pension to which the individual would be entitled in the first and subsequent 
years of  retirement.  Given life tables (supplied by the government  actuary’s 
department) and an assumed discount rate, we can then calculate an expected 
net present discounted value of  social security wealth. This is done, in the 
base case, for a married man. Under current rules, he would be entitled to a 
dependent’s addition to the basic pension if  (as we assume) his wife had no 
rights  of  her own. If  she outlived him, his wife-who,  we assume, is three 
years  his junior-would  inherit the  full  amount  of  his  benefits  (including 
SERPS benefits and excluding the dependent’s addition). We take account of 
this by using mortality data on women as well and looking at the joint probabil- 
ities of one or both of them living to any age (up to one hundred). 
The rules for SERPS that we use are those pertaining to people reaching 
pension  age in  1995. That means that they receive one-eightieth of revalued 
earnings for every year of  work from 1978. The spouse is assumed to have 
rights to the full SERPS pension on the death of her husband. The effects of 
changes in policy reducing the value of SERPS for individuals retiring after 
the year 1999 are not considered. 
So our base case individual, results for whom are shown in table 10.4, is a 
married man, with cohort median earnings up to age fifty and with earnings 
then  rising  with  the  national  average. For the moment,  we  assume that he 
would receive no early retirement benefit were he to retire before age sixty- 
five, as is implied, in theory, by the structure of  the benefit system. We later 
consider the effects of relaxing this assumption by looking at the case of  an 
individual who becomes entitled to the incapacity benefit at age sixty. We have 
4.  As we have already noted, the previous “graduated pension” scheme resulted in benefits so 
small as not to be worthy of  consideration. 422  Richard Blundell and Paul Johnson 
Table 10.4  Base-Case Incentive Simulations 
Last Year  Replacement  ssw  Accrual  Accrual  Tax/ 
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already seen that a very high proportion of individuals receive this benefit be- 
fore age sixty-five. 
In table 10.4, five measures are presented. The first is simply the replace- 
ment rate. This is a measure of pension income in the first year of retirement 
divided by available net earnings in that year. So, if the individual concerned 
could earn E10,OOO (after tax) at age sixty-five and could receive E5,OOO in 
pension benefits, he would have a replacement  rate of 50 percent. For years 
before it is possible to draw a state pension, the replacement rate is not defined. 
The second is a measure of  social security wealth (SSW). At all points, this 
is wealth considered  from the point of view of a fifty-five-year-old, so it is 
discounted to age fifty-five. It is calculated by adding together pension entitle- 
ment from each year of  assumed retirement to age one hundred, conditioned 
on the probability of living to that age. Since the probability of living to such 
an  old age is small, the contribution of discounted wealth at these ages is negli- 
gible.  Survivor benefits are also included  in this calculation conditioned  on 
probability of death of the husband and survival of the wife. 
Social security wealth is itself a net concept, in this case net of projected 
national insurance contributions.  If someone retires at sixty-five, he receives 
benefits from that year on but will have paid national insurance contributions 
in each year up to then. We measure net social security wealth as the difference 
between the discounted sum of projected benefits and the discounted sum of 
projected national insurance contributions (including employer contributions). 
The third measure is social security wealth accrual. This, very straightfor- 
wardly, is the difference between social security wealth in the year before re- 423  Pensions and Retirement in the United Kingdom 
tirement and social security wealth in the year of retirement. It is just a measure 
of how social security wealth changes. A positive number means that an extra 
year of work will increase social security wealth, a negative number that an 
earlier retirement date would maximize it. Accrual rate is just the proportion- 
ate change in social security wealth between the same two years. 
The final numbers presented are tadsubsidy rates, which are the absolute 
accrual amount divided by the earnings available in that year. So, if your social 
security wealth were to rise by &1,000  over the year and your earnings were 
&10,000, you would have a 10 percent subsidy on your earnings to work that 
extra year. Positive numbers, arising from negative social security wealth ac- 
cruals, effectively indicate a tax on the projected earnings. Positive is tax, neg- 
ative subsidy. 
Taking our base case first, table  10.4 shows the results for a married man 
born in 1930, with a wife three years younger and entitled to no pension in her 
own right, and with the base-case smoothed-earnings profile described earlier. 
The pattern of results is quite striking. In each year up to age sixty-five, the 
accrual of social security wealth is slightly negative. Net social security wealth 
conditional on retiring  at age sixty-five is about &2,000  less than that condi- 
tional on retiring at age fifty-five. This difference is small. It reflects two fea- 
tures of the U.K. system and of our calculations. Until age sixty-five, this in- 
dividual  will  be  paying  10  percent  of  his  earnings  in  nation  insurance 
contributions each year, and his employer will be paying an additional 10 per- 
cent. So the cost to working an extra year is substantial. The benefit of working 
an extra year, in terms of social security wealth, comes through extra SERPS 
being accrued. Basic pension entitlement, which makes up the greater part of 
the total state pension, is unaffected  by extra years of work. The loss in net 
income to higher national insurance contributions is significant for each extra 
years of work but adds on only once. The extra amount of SERPS earned is 
small for each year but payable for many years, especially given the existence 
of  a younger wife. These values come close to canceling each other out, but 
the negative effect of extra national insurance contributions is just the greater. 
The accrual rate is small-social  security wealth falls at less than 1 percent 
per year. The effective tax on employment averages out at about 2 percent of 
salary each year. 
This pattern is constant up to the state pension age. Further pension deferral 
increases the available pension, both basic and SERPS, by 7.4 percent. This 
increase would be inherited by  the widow of  our sample man in the (likely) 
event that he were to die first. But, of course, a full year’s pension is sacrificed. 
By the time the man reaches his late sixties, the cost of not claiming the pen- 
sion is beginning to become more substantial, although still not great. 
In this  example, and in what follows, we see no great change in accrual 
rates at age sixty-five that would be likely to explain the very great observed 
retirement hazards at this age. This would seem to be evidence of the impor- 424  Richard Blundell and Paul Johnson 
Table 10.5  Incentive Calculations-Single  Worker 
Last Year  Replacement  ssw  Accrual  Accrual  Tax / 
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tance of social norms, of employer-determined retirement dates, and of the fact 
that all employment protection comes to an end once people pass their sixty- 
fifth birthdays. 
It is also worth noting here that the assumption that the spouse has no rights 
of her own is important. If  she had full rights of her own, then she would not 
be able to inherit her husband’s full rights in the event of his death. 
In table 10.5,  where we consider the case of a single man, the importance of 
marital  status for these  calculations  is  demonstrated  quite  clearly. Pension 
wealth at any age is only around half that for the married man. This reflects 
both the higher pension rights of the married man and the higher survival ex- 
pectations of  his (younger) spouse, who is in a position to inherit the whole of 
his pension. In addition, accruals from extra work are substantially more nega- 
tive at all ages; each extra year of work costs just as much in national insurance 
contributions, but the return  is lower because  there  is no spouse to inherit 
SERPS. Before age sixty-five, these negative accruals effectively  impose an 
extra tax rate of about 10 percent on earnings in each extra year of work. 
Accruals and tax rates become much more negative after age sixty-five as 
the deferment rules are not generous enough to compensate the single man for 
the loss of each year’s pension. Again, the fact that deferral rates are the same 
for men and for women, married and single, places single men at a significant 
disadvantage. 
The other comparison between the single and the married man that is worthy 
of  note is that between replacement rates. Replacement rate at age sixty-five 
for the married man is 46 percent, for the single man 36 percent. This is the 425  Pensions and Retirement in the United Kingdom 
Table 10.6  Incentive Calculations-Ninetieth  Percentile Earnings 
Last Year  Replacement  SSW  Accrual  Accrual  Tax/ 
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Table 10.7  Incentive Calculations-Tenth  Percentile Earnings 
Last Year  Replacement  ssw  Accrual  Accrual  Tax/ 
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effect of the dependent’s addition to the basic pension, which is available to 
the mamed man. 
As tables 10.6 and 10.7 show, the incentive effects for high and low earners 
are remarkably similar to those for middle earners. Tadsubsidy rates for extra 
years of work are very similar. Levels of social security wealth are also much 426  Richard Blundell and Paul Johnson 
Table 10.8  Incentive Calculations, Counting Incapacity Benefit at Age 60 as an 
Early Retirement Benefit 
Last Year  Replacement  ssw  Accrual  Accrual  Tax1 
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alike, largely as a result of the mainly flat-rate nature of the U.K. benefit sys- 
tem. Replacement rates, however, are very different, being very much higher 
for the low earner. 
In table 10.8, we consider the most important divergence from the base case, 
one that may better describe the incentives facing most individuals who would 
be dependent on the state for their pension income. Thus far, we have taken 
the rules of the U.K. social security system literally and modeled incentives as 
though there is no early retirement option. However, the reality is that virtually 
anybody dependent just on the  state provision  would be able to leave work 
earlier and receive state benefits. This is made explicit to some extent in the 
social security system in that, from age sixty on, there is no “availability for 
work test” that must be satisfied before income support will be paid out. Fur- 
thermore, as we saw in the previous section, a very large fraction of men in 
their  early  sixties receives  the  incapacity  benefit  (previously the  invalidity 
benefit). 
With this in mind, we have performed the same calculations as above, but 
on the assumption that benefits become available at age sixty. In particular, we 
have assumed that the incapacity benefit becomes available, although it is simi- 
lar enough in level to income support that the results are almost identical if 
one chooses to model income support instead. 
The effects of  introducing this possibility  are dramatic, indeed. Once age 
sixty is reached, each extra year of work means forgoing a full year’s benefits 
with only a small future increase in SERPS as compensation. The pattern until 
age sixty is familiar. After age sixty, the effects of an extra year of work are to 427  Pensions and Retirement  in the United Kingdom 
reduce social security wealth by about E8,OOO per year. This is equivalent to a 
tax rate of  more than 70 percent on the year’s earnings and means a fall in 
social security wealth of around 10 percent or more for each year of work. 
Until now, it has been hard to understand why the benefit system might cre- 
ate significant incentives to leave work early. Introducing this extra element of 
realism makes it much easier to see its potential role. The penalty for working 
past age sixty can be great, indeed. To the extent that individuals are able to 
claim invalidity pensions  before  age sixty, these arguments could, for some 
people, extend back even further. It is also worth saying that, until the begin- 
ning of  the  1990s, SERPS additions were payable with respect to invalidity 
pensions as well as with respect to retirement pensions. So, for the period up 
to then, incentives to retire before age sixty-five would have been greater still. 
For low earners, the effects of being eligible for benefits  at age sixty are 
even more spectacular. The tax rate on an extra year’s work reaches 91 percent 
at age sixty-one for a married  man  at the tenth percentile  of  earnings.  For 
high earners, the effects are somewhat less dramatic, with the effective tax rate 
reaching a maximum of 60 percent. The potential incentives for low to middle 
earners to leave the labor market are very considerable indeed. 
These observations raise interesting issues about the structure of the U.K. 
benefit system and appear to fit rather well with the observed behavior of many 
older men. Especially for the low paid, there are significant incentives to retire 
early. But it is harder to implicate the social security system alone in the change 
in activity rates since the  1970s for there have been  no major changes that 
could have had such an effect. Put together with the fall in demand for lower- 
skilled workers, however, the relative generosity of social security for older 
groups, especially through apparently easy access to the invalidity benefit, can 
explain  the  observed  fall  in  participation  rates  among  older,  less  skilled 
workers. 
10.4  Occupational Pensions 
As we have stressed throughout, for a large part of the population,  social 
security pensions play only a secondary role in providing retirement income 
and presumably also in the retirement decision. In the private sector, the stan- 
dard occupational pension  offers a pension equal to one-sixtieth of  the final 
salary for each year of membership in the scheme. This was true of nearly two- 
thirds of  private-sector schemes in 1990. So, after forty years of  service, one 
could expect a pension of  two-thirds  of  final earnings.  Of course, very few 
people actually stay in schemes that long. 
There are a variety of  postretirement indexation provisions. Only about 20 
percent of members of private schemes were guaranteed postretirement bene- 
fits to match inflation, a third could expect inflation matching subject to a max- 
imum of  5 percent, and a further quarter were promised  inflation indexation 
up to 3 or 4 percent. This variety of indexation promises is further complicated 428  Richard Blundell and Paul Johnson 
Table 10.9  Proportion of Scheme Members Covered by Particular Early 
Retirement Rules (1990) 
Early Retirement at  Voluntary Early 
Retirement (%)  Request of  Employer (%) 
No provision 
Accrued pension actuarially reduced 
Accrued pension reduced favorably 
Accrued pension with no reduction 














Source: National Association of Pension Funds. 
by the fact that many schemes operate with a degree of discretion in the actual 
awards made. 
In the public sector, a number of schemes provide a pension of one-eightieth 
of the final salary for every year of service but are payable from age sixty and 
guarantee full inflation indexation. 
This range of schemes makes a “typical” pension promise hard to value. The 
job is made infinitely harder by the range of early retirement provisions. Here, 
early means prior to the scheme’s “normal pension age.” This normal pension 
age has traditionally been  sixty-five or sixty-largely  sixty for women  and 
sixty-five for men. European equal treatment legislation has resulted in equal- 
ization between men and women, often at the lower age. Voluntary early retire- 
ment usually offers less generous terms than early retirement at the employer’s 
request. Early retirement for health reasons is often extraordinarily generous: 
“Many schemes calculate the pension on the basis of the member’s earnings at 
the time of retirement, but as if employment had continued until normal retire- 
ment age. This produces a substantially greater benefit than an ordinary early 
retirement” (Pension Law Review Committee  1993, 2.2.39). Employers have 
made use of these generous provisions to ease older individuals  out of work 
(Pension Law Review Committee 1993,4.15.10). Given that the rules defining 
exactly what counts as ill health grounds for early retirement are often unclear, 
there is also scope for employees to make use of them. 
In cases other than ill health, the complex situation is summarized in table 
10.9. Where retirement is at the request of the employer, at least 44 percent 
receive their fully accrued pension with no actuarial reduction, or better. Given 
that this is often offered as part of a voluntary redundancy package, the fact 
that this is designated “at the request of the employer” should not be taken to 
indicate that the employee has no scope for decision making in the face of such 
incentives. Even where the retirement decision is purely voluntary, at least a 
fifth of employees face better than actuarially fair reductions in benefits. 
When early retirement is available, it is often available on generous terms 
that clearly result in losing pension wealth by working longer. The only group 429  Pensions and Retirement in the United Kingdom 
for whom this is unlikely to be true are those who might expect substantial pay 
increases in the years approaching normal retirement age. Otherwise, there is 
clear potential for redistribution  of resources in occupational schemes toward 
earlier retirees as well as toward those whose earnings do increase sharply right 
at the end of their careers. 
10.4.1 
Given the detail we have shown on the effects of state pensions on incentives 
and the fact that  occupational  schemes clearly provide  different incentives, 
there is clear value in considering the actual retirement behavior of each group. 
The differing nature of the rules governing occupational pension schemes 
and those governing state pensions clearly induces different incentives to retire 
before the standard retirement age. On becoming eligible, the most obvious 
effect of occupational pension schemes operates through a wealth effect. Indi- 
viduals eligible for early retirement are less likely to work when their pension 
income is higher. However, occupational pensions may also give an incentive 
to work longer since continued employment increases eventual pension entitle- 
ment when pensions are typically linked to final earnings. 
These differential incentives should show themselves in observed transition 
rates out of employment for those nearing retirement. To analyze this, we con- 
sider results from the  1988-1989  U.K. Retirement Survey.s This data source 
covers  some twenty-five  hundred  households  in  the  age range  fifty-five to 
sixty-nine. It gives detailed employment and pension life histories. It is a retro- 
spective work history data set unique in the United Kingdom, recording all job 
spells for each individual  in the household  and carrying health information 
based on a detailed description of medical symptoms. 
Figure  10.15 shows retirement probabilities for men at each age between 
forty and sixty-five, separately for those with and without an occupational pen- 
sion. (These are not retirement hazards.) Retirement is defined as leaving work 
and never reentering before age sixty-five. It is clear that the probability  of 
retirement before age fifty-five is greater for those without  an occupational 
pension. From age fifty-five, those with a pension are more likely to retire at 
each age. This pattern  in part reflects the composition of  the two groups- 
those without an occupational pension tend to be less skilled and more likely 
to be forced out of the labor market very early. Those with occupational pen- 
sions start to be able to take attractive levels of pensions from age fifty-five. 
The spike at age sixty is much more apparent for those with occupational pen- 
sions, reflecting the substantial proportion for whom this is the scheme’s nor- 
mal retirement age. 
The equivalent picture for women is shown in figure 10.16.  Here, the biggest 
Occupational Schemes and Retirement Behavior 
5.  For more information on this data, see Bone et al. (1992) and Disney, Grundy, and Johnson 
(1997).  Examples of use of the panel element of these data include Tanner (1998), Disney, Johnson, 
and Stears, and Johnson, Stears, and Webb (1998). 430  Richard Blundell and Paul Johnson 
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Fig. 10.15  Retirement probabilities for men (OP = occupational pension) 
Age 
Fig. 10.16  Retirement probabilities for women (OP = occupational pension) 
difference is in the  size of  the spikes at age sixty. Those with  occupational 
pensions are more than twice as likely as those without to retire at age sixty. 
At  first sight, this  appears surprising given that  those without  occupational 
pensions are dependent just on the basic pension, for which the normal pension 
age is exactly sixty. But many will not have full entitlement in any case; within 
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Fig. 10.18  Survival functions for women (OP = occupational pension) 
sixty, and general attachment to the labor market is likely to be much lower for 
those without an occupational pension. The gains from working until age sixty 
for those with occupational pensions are much greater than for those without. 
Disney, Meghir, and Whitehouse (1994) demonstrate similar effects using 
retirement  hazards from the  same data. They, too, find that the  structure of 
pension benefits shifts the retirement probabilities, deterring individuals from 
retiring just prior to the earliest potential receipt of benefits. Once an individual 
is eligible for benefits, the hazard rate and probability of  labor market exit are 
significantly increased. 
Survival functions for men  are plotted  in figure  10.17 and for women  in 
figure 10.18.  The figures show the probability of  survival in the labor force at 
each age from forty to sixty-five  according  to occupational  pension  status. 
They demonstrate very clearly for both men and women that those with occu- 
pational pensions are much more likely to remain in the labor market at least 
until age sixty than are those without. From age sixty, the survival probabilities 
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The labor market experience of the two groups is shown to be profoundly 
different. The lower retirement hazards at earlier ages among the occupational 
pension sample, resulting from both a lower exit rate and a lower probability 
of never subsequently  working, mean that a large gap opens up between the 
two pension groups. After age fifty-five, the gap begins to close. These survival 
functions confirm the importance of  the incentives provided by  occupational 
pension  schemes: the survival probability is considerably higher just before 
retirement benefits  may become due (either “full”  or early retirement), and 
thereafter  the survival probability  falls much more rapidly than that of those 
not covered by pension schemes. For those without occupational pensions, re- 
tirement behavior is considerably more heterogeneous.  Retirement ages cover 
a larger age range and have a broader distribution. These differences in this 
survival  to retirement functions  are  consistent with what  we  would  expect 
given the incentive structure built in occupational pensions. 
10.5  Conclusions 
There have been significant changes in labor market behavior among older 
individuals in the United Kingdom since the  1970s. Participation and activity 
rates, especially among men over age fifty-five, have fallen dramatically. While 
it is hard  to see any  changes to the  social  security  system that might  have 
caused this, the social security  system does provide significant incentives to 
retire early if, as is often the case, benefits can be received before age sixty- 
five. For those who can get invalidity benefits-and  these individuals account 
for more than 40 percent of nonworking sixty- to sixty-four-year-olds-the 
system comes close to working as providing early retirement benefits with no 
actuarial reduction. The same is true for individuals who are entitled to income 
support in this age group. One in eight men receives this benefit. The relative 
generosity of these benefits and the incentives that they create, combined with 
the reduced  demand for unskilled  labor, must play a part in explaining the 
observed fall in labor market participation. 
Among those with occupational pensions,  significant increases in pension 
wealth could have had an important effect on increased early retirement, as 
could the relatively  generous treatment of  early retirement by  many occupa- 
tional  schemes. We have shown that the retirement behavior of  occupational 
pensioners differs significantly from that of  those without occupational pen- 
sions in ways that are consistent with the former taking advantage of generous 
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Appendix 
Evidence of  the Effect of  State Pensions on Retirement 
Although there is a large international literature that has addressed the issue 
of  estimating  models  of  retirement  behavior,6 there  is  little  evidence  for 
the  United  Kingdom.  Here,  we  draw  on  the  recent  study  by  Meghir  and 
Whitehouse (1997) using the U.K. Retirement Survey data described above to 
examine the effect of various features of the pension system as well as earnings 
and demographic and health  variables on the transition  into retirement.  The 
only previous econometric study for the United Kingdom was that by Zabalza, 
Pissarides, and Barton (1980), which used an earlier retirement survey but pre- 
sented a purely static model of labor market participation at retirement in rela- 
tion to the “earnings rule” discussed in section 10.2 above. 
It is difficult to argue that retirement in the United Kingdom can be modeled 
as a well-defined labor market state distinct from other spells out of work. On 
the one hand, men within the state pension  scheme can draw a pension only 
after age sixty-five; even this can be deferred at any point in time at a (more or 
less) actuarially fair rate. However, as we have seen, in addition to own savings, 
the state social security  system, including the invalidity benefit, provides  an 
important source of income for those out of work before that age. Those with 
occupational pensions are not prohibited  from working even after drawing a 
pension early so long as they change employers. Thus, the obvious approach 
to modeling the age at which individuals leave the labor market is to study the 
transitions in and out of work up to age sixty-five, beyond which only very few 
men work. This is the approach followed in Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) 
and Disney, Meghir, and Whitehouse (1994). It was also followed recently by 
Blau (1994) for the United States. 
In their reduced-form equations, Disney and Whitehouse show that, among 
other variables, health and the aggregate unemployment rate both have a strong 
and negative effect on the exit rate and that education increases the exit rate. 
The occupational variables included relate to the ones observed in the previous 
job. Professional/managerial  workers have lower exit rates back to work and 
clerical  workers higher vis-i-vis manual workers; nevertheless,  these differ- 
ences seem completely insignificant. When unobserved heterogeneity is taken 
into account, the effects of health and the unemployment rate increase. The exit 
rate elasticity with respect to aggregate unemployment for a manual worker at 
the start of the spell with mean education and age fifty-four is -  1.16. 
These results imply that age, health, and labor market conditions are impor- 
tant determinants of  early retirement, as defined above. They affect the exit 
rate from jobs and change the rate of  return  to work in opposite directions. 
Thus, older men and men in poor health  are likely  to retire earlier, and the 
6.  Including Berkovec and Stem (1988), Stock and Wise (1990). and Rust (1989)  on the United 
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incidence of early retirement becomes more prevalent in periods of high unem- 
ployment. It is possible that both these effects are operating through the wage. 
But  it is very  likely that  the aggregate  unemployment  rate  and health both 
operate through the job arrival rate. Further, health is also likely to change the 
tastes toward work. 
“Structural”  transition  equations,  including  earnings and  benefits  out of 
work, were also estimated. Social security benefits were shown to have a nega- 
tive effect on the rate of return back to work, while earnings have a negative 
effect in the transition out of work and a positive effect on the rate of return 
back to work. The most significant effect was that of earnings on the job exit 
rate. Again, health and age have important effects.’ 
These results do indicate that incentive effects may play an important role 
in determining the age of retirement. The overall effect of benefits on the prob- 
ability of retirement at a particular age (i.e., job exit at that age and nonreturn 
to work thereafter) can be calculated from a combination of the two estimated 
transition models. On the basis of  the results, which control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, the elasticity with respect to benefits is about -0.36.  In terms 
of these results, the job exit rate elasticity with respect to earnings (-0.54)  is 
the strongest indication that economic incentives may affect the retirement age 
even for individuals without an occupational pension, indicating that lower- 
paid individuals do drop out of the labor market first. 
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